In considering how to weigh the risks and benefits of synthetic biology, Kaebnick, Gusmano, and Murray pose the question of whether there is scientific re­search that should not be funded or performed, or if there are potentially dangerous results that should not be wide­ly disseminated. Such questions, they propose, require a new set of rules and norms for knowledge generation—an “ethics of knowledge.” They identify two examples of research that might fall into a nonpermissible category, including “research that is aimed (...) at producing and dis­seminating knowledge of... how to produce more dan­gerous forms of H5N1 and smallpox.” There are already rules and norms to guide the funding and generation of scientific knowledge, however, including research on in­fluenza and smallpox. Even if more rules and guidance were added to the practice of science, potentially prob­lematic, “dual‐use” research would still occur, and as a practical matter, it is unlikely that results from those stud­ies can be contained, particularly if the research is of wide interest. (shrink)

CRISPR, a recently developed gene-editing tool, has become synonymous with rapid biological advancement. While gene editing had been performed in life sciences research for decades, genetic engineering with CRISPR is much more straightforward, faster, and less expensive—and thus, the technology has been rapidly democratized. CRISPR was built on a natural mechanism, the method by which bacteria resist infections from viruses called bacteriophage. Once infected, bacteria may recognize specific genetic sequences of the invading bacteriophage virus and chop its genetic material into (...) pieces. This bacterial immune response, discovered through basic research, has been exploited by scientists to develop a gene-editing tool... (shrink)